We propose an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic and characterize the probability functions which satisfy it. In particular in the case of a language with just two predicates the probability functions satisfying this principle correspond to solutions of Skyrmsʼ ‘Wheel of Fortune’.

We propose two principles of inductive reasoning related to how observed information is handled by conditioning, and justify why they may be said to represent aspects of rational reasoning. A partial classification is given of the probability functions which satisfy these principles.

This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense (...) that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain. (shrink)

Recent corporate legal and ethical meltdowns suggest that avoiding such harms to companies and to society requires a significant culture change within the organization. This paper addresses the issue of what it takes to change a corporate culture. While conventional wisdom may suggest that a change requires only the institution of an ethics office with proper reporting paths and an ethics code, such an approach is only a beginning. Many large corporations, especially those in danger of legal and ethical catastrophes, (...) need to undertake multiple initiatives to generate a new culture that manifests new values and new vocabularies. A cultural change accomplished by changing large numbers of personnel is expensive in financial and human terms. One component of a less costly approach is to tell new and different stories within the corporation because stories establish the cultural DNA that gives organizations, families, and individuals their identities. Such changes in individual firms, however, are influenced by the ideological assumptions within which and under which the industry and the society operates. (shrink)

**A newly revised edition of two seminal works on Imperial Rome** Undeniably one of Rome’s most important historians, Tacitus was also one of its most gifted. *The Agricola* is both a portrait of Julius Agricola-the most famous governor of Roman Britain and Tacitus’s respected father-in-law-and the first known detailed portrayal of the British Isles. In the *Germania*, Tacitus focuses on the warlike German tribes beyond the Rhine, often comparing the behavior of "barbarian" peoples favorably with the decadence and corruption of (...) Imperial Rome. (shrink)

In Pure Inductive Logic, the rational principle of Predicate Exchangeability states that permuting the predicates in a given language L and replacing each occurrence of a predicate in an L-sentence phi according to this permutation should not change our belief in the truth of phi. In this paper we study when a prior probability function w on a purely unary language L satisfying Predicate Exchangeability also satisfies the principle of Unary Language Invariance.

The notion of reasonable interpretation of legal texts, as opposed to the absurd or unacceptable interpretation, is presupposed in different legal theories as the fundamental basis of legal rationality and as a clear limitation to chaotic behaviour by courts. This article argues that the ever-present notion of reasonability is not a useful descriptive tool for understanding legal practices or how legal institutions work. The article builds on radical legal realism perspective in order to develop two arguments supporting this claim. First, (...) it argues that, from an empirical point of view, the complexity of contemporary law and its multiple layers of normativity do not allow for the description of what a reasonable interpretation is, since no coherent universal interpretative community can be envisioned. Second, from a conceptual point of view, it argues that describing the references interpreters make to reasonability as references to a semantic object—that is, to some kind of universal “reasonableness”, a model of reasonable behaviour or rationality—is not a reliable way of understanding judicial practice in a certain legal context. This is the case because, as an internal justification discourse, the appeal to reasonability by the interpreter has no bearing on truth or correctness. Nothing prevents courts from cherry-picking a meaning for reasonability in each case, using it as the justification to solve similar cases in different, sometimes contradictory ways. In short, the concept of reasonability cannot be taken, in itself, as an instrument of legal analysis. As a prescriptive discourse, it can merely be one of the objects legal science intends to observe and explain. Its discursive functions—not its semantic references—, as part of a strategy to convince and to justify, are the only observable elements that can sustain a coherent falsifiable description by legal science. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

While cetaceans clearly show social learning in a wide variety of contexts, to label this as hides more than it reveals: we need a taxonomy of culture to tease apart the differences rather than hiding them in a catch-all category.